Güney27 wrote: ↑Tue Feb 04, 2025 9:00 pm Ok I see what you mean and your right. There is something very unique in Steiners philosophy that none other has. That’s the thing that is clear. But the approach goes at least in the right direction in a couple of „new“ philosophers. Heidegger approached many similar things as in Clerics essay „FOTHC“. But nevertheless in heideggers case it has not the same clarity and depth.
I have a collection of essays which are published by gadamer into a huge book format, where philologist and philosopher explain the context of words from the Greeks. It’s very astonishing that the meaning and understanding of words has changed so dramatically. I somehow find these sort of books more fascinating and helpful than philosophical texts. In Heidegger there is a good of both, he often tries to elucidate the old understanding of words, which are now abstract and which philosophers trough around like toys. I don’t can extract much value from philosophy and often start reading books and then leaving them aside. In Steiners case it different, sometimes it gets really hard (GA 3 for example) and I take a break, but then I’m back because his writings are highly practical.
Is there an English version of that Gadamer collection?
Today I read Bergson for a couple hours (MaM) and can’t say anything definitive about him. He starts with framing the hard problem and the problem of idealism. He describes that the material world is nothing more than a picture at the end, and we isolate a part of it (brain) and make it responsible for the whole of the picture. He goes in detail about these topic and tries to Modell of a new theory, that overcomes the hard problem and the idealistic problems. It’s very sophisticated and deep thought. I will read more to comment more about it but in the end it’s he tries to explain perception in the form of a (I must say that he really has interesting insights so that’s no critique or something like that, I only try to understand the limitations of his approach) theory. One problem is that he states that the world/universe a picture, which I think is true, but he forgets the cognitive aspect that makes it possible to state this fact, and which makes possible to live our lives in our current condition.
In a sense we then still navigate trough a Cartesian arena. We feel like subjects watching trough our eyes what is there outside and independent. I came across one in the library of the local university, where is a professor has written a almost thousand page critique of Steiners philosophy. I will read it when I have read the books I’m reading now. His name is Hartmut Traub. It seems like a criticism that tries to show that steiners philosophy is nothing original but a copy of various elements of German idealists. But I’ll see.
Yeah, that is a notoriously problematic topic, especially when one begins polarizing too much to the mystical end of the spectrum (which I don't think was the case for Bergson, but generally everyone who explores intuitive realities without higher cognition tends to start leaning that way). They start to lean toward 'the World is my mental picture' (Schopenhauer). We saw that clearly in the discussion with Felipe as well. As we know, a truly phenomenological approach recognizes that, in the givens of experience, there are differentiated aspects of our immanent experiential flow and some aspects feel to be relatively independent of our momentary intents, imagination, thoughts, feelings, etc. It is simply a mystical fiction that all of these aspects can be flattened into a single category of "my representations" or "my subjectivity". (again, I don't think this was what Bergson was doing)
For example, if I imagine a red color over a white wall, the red color feels to be directly caused by my imaginative intent but the sensory color still feels to 'outweigh' it, to be more consistent and stable than my imagined red color. This applies not only to sensory experience, but also our emotional life. If I get in a heated argument with a friend and am swamped in frustration and anger, no matter how much I repeat to myself "stop being angry, it makes no sense!", it is unlikely that will override the feeling of anger. So there are clearly aspects of our immanent and first-person experiential flow that exist along a gradient of *resistance* to our intentional and imaginative activity. And the furthest end of this gradient, we approach what we experience as the physical world.
On the other hand, we have to distinguish between living experience of the physical world and the mathematized picture that modern science has formed of it. Bergson's critique certainly applies to the latter, because these are indeed the flattened mental pictures of philosopher-scientists which have been isolated from the living sensory flow (which embeds contextual depth, as discussed) and are then imagined to be the foundation for that flow. But as you also imply, we have to be careful of feeling like these mental pictures have no relation to the intuitive depth of reality. It is only that we will never discover the relation if we only focus on their contents (the 'what') without also spiraling together the what with the how/why they have arrived in our conscious state, i.e. through the convolutions of the contextual depth.