Philosophical Speculations

I understand why Bernardo brings up the experiments with psychedelics that show an increase in complex experience with a decrease in brain activity.


But doesn't idealism (especially his model, which I adhere to) predict that eventually we probably will have instruments that pick up brain activity that correlates to the complex experience? The brain is merely the image of the experience. The more fine tuned our instruments (which themselves are images of experience), the more we find correlates. Therefore, as we create more appropriate instruments, we'd expect to begin seeing correlates, yeah?

If the brain is the image of a localization of mind, and taking psychedelics causes the private mind to disintegrate this localized mode, you would expect 2 different images, no?

findingblanks wrote: ↑Mon Mar 29, 2021 2:02 pm I understand why Bernardo brings up the experiments with psychedelics that show an increase in complex experience with a decrease in brain activity.


But doesn't idealism (especially his model, which I adhere to) predict that eventually we probably will have instruments that pick up brain activity that correlates to the complex experience? The brain is merely the image of the experience. The more fine tuned our instruments (which themselves are images of experience), the more we find correlates. Therefore, as we create more appropriate instruments, we'd expect to begin seeing correlates, yeah?

I think I've pointed this out before too. I can't see why the "brain as image" would suddenly lose its correlation with experience as soon as psychedelics are taken. I think it comes down to whether there is really is an expansion of experience with psychedelics. The expansion could be a misunderstanding of the experience. It is subjective anyway.

Shaibei wrote: ↑Mon Mar 29, 2021 2:46 pm If the brain is the image of a localization of mind, and taking psychedelics causes the private mind to disintegrate this localized mode, you would expect 2 different images, no?

In deep sleep or under anesthesia, there is less activity in the brain too. In those cases, less activity corresponds with less experience. So why are psychedelics exceptions to the rule?

Actually I think they are not. A chaotic and disordered experience is being mistaken for expanded awareness because the brain manages to impose an order on the experience. The imposed order generates the experience of meaningfulness, the content of which conforms usually according to the set and setting principles that guide psychedelic experiences.

In deep sleep or under anesthesia, there is less activity in the brain too. In those cases, less activity corresponds with less experience. So why are psychedelics exceptions to the rule?

BK's model has psychedelics as having the ability to increase the porosity or permeability of the localised individual dissociative boundary, thus letting in (or giving us access to) nonlocal transpersonal consciousness.

Kastrup states that materialist metaphysics are lost in abstraction yet idealists use the abstraction of brain as an Image of consciousness being interferred with to justify the corelates of anesthesia with consciousness.

Ben Iscatus wrote: ↑Tue Mar 30, 2021 1:00 pm

In deep sleep or under anesthesia, there is less activity in the brain too. In those cases, less activity corresponds with less experience. So why are psychedelics exceptions to the rule?

BK's model has psychedelics as having the ability to increase the porosity or permeability of the localised individual dissociative boundary, thus letting in (or giving us access to) nonlocal transpersonal consciousness.

But there is zero evidence for this unless this is just a restatement of the old filter theory. It also begs the question of why psychedelics, which I guess are images of something (psychedelics in a mental form rather than material form?), would produce this effect.

All of the evidence for psychedelics is that it breaks down the internal model and representation of the external world, but this all happens inside the boundary. There is no evidence I am aware of about the boundary itself becoming more porous whatever that means.

Dave - the way you word that looks like dualism. For Idealism, alter consciousness is interfered with by another process or idea in consciousness.

The brain is just the image of our human consciousness (viewed from across a dissociative boundary), while the anaesthetic is just the image of the process or idea of anaesthesia which interferes with human consciousness.

Ben Iscatus wrote: ↑Tue Mar 30, 2021 3:20 pm Dave - the way you word that looks like dualism. For Idealism, alter consciousness is interfered with by another process or idea in consciousness.

The brain is just the image of our human consciousness (viewed from across a dissociative boundary), while the anaesthetic is just the image of the process or idea of anaesthesia which interferes with human consciousness.

So the psychedelic really is an image of a psychedelic? Not the material chemical psychedelic which is just the image of the real psychedelic?

Anyway, my point is simply that Bernardo's model would predict that the psychedelic experience would look like some perceptual structure from across a dissociated boundary given the adequate interaction tool.

So, just as 100 years ago we couldn't simply look at a brain to see how a dream can appear across the boundary, today we don't have the adequate tools to translate the psychedelic experience into an image.

But when we do eventually have that tool, it won't invalidate BKs model. This is why I think it isn't his best argument. Because his model also predicts that we very well could eventually find new activity in the body that correlates with psychedelic experience.