Eugene I wrote: ↑Thu May 06, 2021 2:05 pm
I get what you are saying, Cleric, thanks. But I have a very disciplined mind and always want to clarify all assumptions and axioms in every paradigm I investigate. So, here "The great difficulty is that we can't really grasp the idea in its supposed pure reality" you are saying that there is a "pure reality" of living ideas even when no subjects/alters experience them through thought?
No. My experience doesn't at all depend on the postulation of pure reality of living ideas. That's why I said 'supposed' pure reality - it can only exist as abstract thought in our mind (as FSM). As far as our given experience is concern we always have qualia (perceptions) together with meaning (idea).
Eugene I wrote: ↑Thu May 06, 2021 2:05 pm
This relates to my second question of the possibility of existence of ideas in "pure form" without the immanent aspect of experiencing. Because if we pose that ideas can exist in a non-experienced form (in which no subjects whatsoever experience them), then it means that the "experiencing" is not longer a truly immanent aspect of reality, and then we run into the "hard problem" again - how the immanent ideas can make non-immanent experience to happen?
What I said above answers this question. It's useless to try to imagine pure ideas without experience, precisely because, as you say, we only create a hard problem for ourselves. Yet this doesn't preclude the fact that the
experienced ideas exist in certain relations. To give a simplified example, if I think about 1 and 2, then 4 and 5, does this mean that 3 doesn't exist until it is experienced? From experiential perspective every idea exists
for me only when I experience it. But still, the relation between 2 and 4 is such that they can only be what they are if there's 3 in between. That's why I've always said (when you bring the Platonism argument) that it's irrelevant to me to fantasize some abstract container for ideas, which I can never experience in its purity. The important thing is that when I discover 3, nothing really changes for 1,2,4,5 - they are only
complemented, the ideal picture becomes more complete. Even if 3 was never discovered, the relation between the above numbers would be
as if 3 exists. This would be different if after the discovery of 3 all other numbers change relations. Then we would really have justification to speak of ideas being
created. The act of creation of the idea has measurable effect and displaces all other ideas in some way. But as long as I discover ideas and beings, which only complement
my own experiential ideal landscape, all talks about if these ideas and beings exist in 'pure form' before I experience them, is pointless.
We can look again at Indra's net.
(Scott, thank you for mentioning this. I was not familiar with this Buddhist metaphor. I was very excited to read it. It's practically word for word as what I tried to present in my metaphor using modern terminology, as states of being, which interfere, similar to Feynman path integration. I've never heard of Indra's net but clearly I've been exploring in meditation the same domain of the invisible world from which this ancient metaphor was inspired).
So our every state of being is a bead, an experiential unity of perception and idea. Yet our momentary (impermanent) state of being is such that it can only be what it is, if it exists in certain relations with infinite number of other states of being. Whether these states of being (and their corresponding meaningful/ideal content) 'really' exist is immaterial. The fact is that when I expand the horizon of my cognition to include other ideas I would discover these idea-beings and they'll complement my current experience
as if they have always been there. I gain nothing if I fantasize some special container for not yet experienced states of being (and their corresponding ideas) - I only add intellectual weight. On the other hand I also don't gain anything if I insist that these states and ideas are created for the first time when I experience them. As said, this would be justified if the creation moves and displaces other already experienced ideas but this is not the case. The newly 'created' idea simply fits perfectly within the ideal landscape, only complementing the picture, as if it has always been there.