Philosophical Speculations

Güney27 wrote: ↑Fri Jun 20, 2025 7:42 pm Steiner’s *Philosophy of Freedom* shows certain parallels but does not strictly practice phenomenology. His anthroposophy, which describes layers of subjectivity (if one may call it that) inaccessible to the uninitiated, quickly veers into metaphysics or remains a partially inaccessible description.

Güney27 wrote: ↑Fri Jun 20, 2025 7:42 pm It is not possible to provide a brief and precise summary of phenomenological methodology, as it is a vast field with not just one methodology but various modifications and further developments. I am currently working on gaining a thorough understanding, so please be aware that this is not a definitive description of the methodology. As you know, phenomenology was founded by Husserl, who, like Steiner, was a student of Brentano and deeply influenced by him. Phenomenology is an attempt to acquire knowledge free from dogmatic assumptions about "reality"; it seeks to bracket all possible presuppositions about the nature of the world and to describe, through a rigorous method, the appearance (the self-manifestation) of phenomena. All sciences face the problem that they cannot verify their foundational assumptions (axioms), yet often require them; Husserl, however, strives to attain knowledge without such presuppositions.

Phenomenology is neither introspection nor a mere description of objects (as we might describe a table in everyday life). Instead, it seeks, through its methodology, to gain knowledge of how the transcendental subject contributes to the possibility of phenomena manifesting themselves (self-manifestation). Husserl does not claim (as far as I understand him thus far) that the transcendental subject creates the world out of nothing, nor that phenomenology solely studies this subjectivity. He argues that phenomenology can take the self-givenness of any phenomenon as its starting point—how something appears to us, so to speak—which, in turn, necessitates embedding the transcendental subject (which, unlike in Kant, is not an ideal abstraction that filters and enables the appearance of the phenomenal but the core of our subjectivity, distinct from our empirical self) in our investigation. This is because, through intentionality (a key concept in Husserl, distinct from its mundane meaning), the subject influences the appearance of phenomena. Thus, phenomenology is the study of appearing phenomena and their givenness, conducted through a rigorous methodology. We could delve deeper into this topic, but I think this suffices for a rough outline.

Max Scheler modified Husserl’s methodology, as did Jean-Luc Marion (an important phenomenologist who used phenomenology to explore the religious). There are many methodological approaches based on the same foundations. Heidegger also modified Husserl’s methodology. It is, therefore, a rich field of contemplative investigation. Steiner’s *Philosophy of Freedom* shows certain parallels but does not strictly practice phenomenology. His anthroposophy, which describes layers of subjectivity (if one may call it that) inaccessible to the uninitiated, quickly veers into metaphysics or remains a partially inaccessible description. Cleric engages in phenomenology in a certain sense; to be honest, I see the inspiration of Steiner’s philosophy in his texts, but also a profoundly different way of articulating it, with distinctive features not found in Steiner. I would thus describe Cleric’s texts as philosophical reflections inspired by Steiner, but not as a mere reformulation or introduction to his works.

In *GA 5*, Steiner discusses fascinating philosophical themes. He critiques the Platonic separation of idea and appearance. Later, he views Plato in a different context, as someone who consciously moved within ideational spheres. Yet, I find something Platonic in Steiner’s philosophy: does he not also see ideas as a sphere distant (in a phenomenological sense) from appearances, which are then actualized in concepts through the movement of thinking and added to appearances to attain knowledge (which, in Steiner’s works, simultaneously signifies the manifestation or genesis of the “world”)? This semantic sphere seems to me the pivotal point of Steiner’s philosophy. We cannot grasp this sphere through intellectual models, as they are always already crystallizations of this Platonic dimension; any theory of the semantic dimension would inevitably fail. Nor can we say anything about this dimension, such as recognizing its genesis or describing its “essence.” How, then, does thinking inhabit this dimension, and how can we speak about it? This is, for me, the most important topic. I see interesting approaches in Steiner’s philosophy and in Heidegger’s hermeneutics, but neither offers a fully satisfactory methodology.

P.S.: Thank you for the reference to Scheler. A few weeks ago, I was interested in reading his book but set it aside. Now I’ve started reading that book and another one. Thank you very much!

Cleric wrote: ↑Sat Jun 21, 2025 8:58 am

Güney27 wrote: ↑Fri Jun 20, 2025 7:42 pm Steiner’s *Philosophy of Freedom* shows certain parallels but does not strictly practice phenomenology. His anthroposophy, which describes layers of subjectivity (if one may call it that) inaccessible to the uninitiated, quickly veers into metaphysics or remains a partially inaccessible description.

Guney, can you conceive of a way of expression that speaks of the inner depth of the phenomenological Cosmos which won't sound to you as mere metaphysics? In other words, what do you anticipate to hear such that you say "Now here's something more than metaphysics! Now these are true communications depicting the patterns and rhythms of becoming of the Great Inner Cosmic flow within which my limited perspectival flow is embedded"?

AshvinP wrote: ↑Sat Jun 21, 2025 12:10 pm

Güney27 wrote: ↑Fri Jun 20, 2025 7:42 pm It is not possible to provide a brief and precise summary of phenomenological methodology, as it is a vast field with not just one methodology but various modifications and further developments. I am currently working on gaining a thorough understanding, so please be aware that this is not a definitive description of the methodology. As you know, phenomenology was founded by Husserl, who, like Steiner, was a student of Brentano and deeply influenced by him. Phenomenology is an attempt to acquire knowledge free from dogmatic assumptions about "reality"; it seeks to bracket all possible presuppositions about the nature of the world and to describe, through a rigorous method, the appearance (the self-manifestation) of phenomena. All sciences face the problem that they cannot verify their foundational assumptions (axioms), yet often require them; Husserl, however, strives to attain knowledge without such presuppositions.

Phenomenology is neither introspection nor a mere description of objects (as we might describe a table in everyday life). Instead, it seeks, through its methodology, to gain knowledge of how the transcendental subject contributes to the possibility of phenomena manifesting themselves (self-manifestation). Husserl does not claim (as far as I understand him thus far) that the transcendental subject creates the world out of nothing, nor that phenomenology solely studies this subjectivity. He argues that phenomenology can take the self-givenness of any phenomenon as its starting point—how something appears to us, so to speak—which, in turn, necessitates embedding the transcendental subject (which, unlike in Kant, is not an ideal abstraction that filters and enables the appearance of the phenomenal but the core of our subjectivity, distinct from our empirical self) in our investigation. This is because, through intentionality (a key concept in Husserl, distinct from its mundane meaning), the subject influences the appearance of phenomena. Thus, phenomenology is the study of appearing phenomena and their givenness, conducted through a rigorous methodology. We could delve deeper into this topic, but I think this suffices for a rough outline.

Max Scheler modified Husserl’s methodology, as did Jean-Luc Marion (an important phenomenologist who used phenomenology to explore the religious). There are many methodological approaches based on the same foundations. Heidegger also modified Husserl’s methodology. It is, therefore, a rich field of contemplative investigation. Steiner’s *Philosophy of Freedom* shows certain parallels but does not strictly practice phenomenology. His anthroposophy, which describes layers of subjectivity (if one may call it that) inaccessible to the uninitiated, quickly veers into metaphysics or remains a partially inaccessible description. Cleric engages in phenomenology in a certain sense; to be honest, I see the inspiration of Steiner’s philosophy in his texts, but also a profoundly different way of articulating it, with distinctive features not found in Steiner. I would thus describe Cleric’s texts as philosophical reflections inspired by Steiner, but not as a mere reformulation or introduction to his works.

In *GA 5*, Steiner discusses fascinating philosophical themes. He critiques the Platonic separation of idea and appearance. Later, he views Plato in a different context, as someone who consciously moved within ideational spheres. Yet, I find something Platonic in Steiner’s philosophy: does he not also see ideas as a sphere distant (in a phenomenological sense) from appearances, which are then actualized in concepts through the movement of thinking and added to appearances to attain knowledge (which, in Steiner’s works, simultaneously signifies the manifestation or genesis of the “world”)? This semantic sphere seems to me the pivotal point of Steiner’s philosophy. We cannot grasp this sphere through intellectual models, as they are always already crystallizations of this Platonic dimension; any theory of the semantic dimension would inevitably fail. Nor can we say anything about this dimension, such as recognizing its genesis or describing its “essence.” How, then, does thinking inhabit this dimension, and how can we speak about it? This is, for me, the most important topic. I see interesting approaches in Steiner’s philosophy and in Heidegger’s hermeneutics, but neither offers a fully satisfactory methodology.

P.S.: Thank you for the reference to Scheler. A few weeks ago, I was interested in reading his book but set it aside. Now I’ve started reading that book and another one. Thank you very much!

You are technically correct that Steiner does not practice the phenomenological method founded in this philosophical tradition of Husserl et al. I may instead call his approach a meta-phenomenology. It stays firmly within the domain of given experiential states and their lawful metamorphoses, but expands the sphere of those states along a depth axis of phenomenal consciousness that is normally unsuspected and requires the soul to take a somewhat inverted stance than the philosophical intellect is familiar with. In this meta-phenomenological method, the transcendent subject does not only think about how it participates in the appearances with intentionality, but experiences itself in the real-time unfoldment of that participation along intentional vectors. The transcendent subject feels itself steering through the intuitive (semantic) spaces over which the appearances are shaped and modulated, and can then artistically express the qualities, characteristics, relations, and patterns of these spaces with images and intellectual concepts (which themselves are appearances that we feel uniquely responsible for shaping).

All of spiritual science can be understood in this meta-way, but it's difficult to recognize the phenomenal relations being spoken of at first. We cannot help but think of them abstractly as mostly floating concepts to begin with. We don't need to try to figure out the phenomenological significance of every spiritual scientific result and revelation immediately. What is most critical is to realize that, by orienting to the inner principles of our existential movie flow (such as illustrated in Cleric's essays), we come to the core ideas of spiritual science no matter what. If we have never heard of Steiner or esoteric science, we will still end up thinking through and perhaps even writing about these main ideas. If we do happen to be familiar with Steiner, then everything we find in the lectures starts to make immediate intuitive sense, because we have already experienced something that reminds us of those concepts in the characteristic principles of our inner process.

We don't need metaphysical assumptions to see why this intimate connection between our inner process and the spiritual 'essences' of the Cosmos must be the case. We only need to see that, if it were any other way, then we would be postulating a metaphysical dualism between our immanently experienced cognitive process and the wider World process. If reality is unified, then the latter must be coming to expression in the former and accessible to our introspective efforts. The meta-method is not about using our concepts to explain how phenomenologically experienced reality works, but moving and dancing together with that reality as it works and focusing this dynamic experience into concepts (and this is what more abstract thinkers also do without being keenly conscious of doing so, which is what makes their approach non-meta and liable to reach unhealthy understanding of inner realities). It can be loosely compared to the experiential difference between commenting on a sporting event and playing in that event.

We should appreciate that, eventually, the intellect would drive itself into decoherence and madness if it tried to encompass all these continually evolving inner dynamics, to continually piece them together with reflective pictures and build models of them. Thus, the inverted prayerful stance becomes necessary for the meta-phenomenology to advance. I heard faith characterized recently as a humble orientation toward more integrated knowledge, which certainly exists (in the possession of our higher/future self), but which we don't yet encompass with our familiar experiences and concepts. This stuck with me as a good way to characterize how faith and knowledge-thinking are inextricably linked together, the former being a soul force that is necessary for growing into the future potential of the latter (so many verses of scripture are also deepened when we orient to faith in this way). This future potential is not a metaphysical speculation, it is a phenomenal reality that we continually experience and live out from moment to moment, day to day. Yet it only starts to feel like the concrete 'stuff' of reality when we faithfully synchronize our inner activity with the rhythmic cognitive flow through which our states are continually integrating and manifesting new potential.

Güney27 wrote: ↑Sat Jun 21, 2025 5:13 pm For example, as you correctly noted, if we manage to stop thinking of our body in the third person as an image visible in space and focus on the given experience of “being a body,” this leads to new insights. Instead of thinking about concepts like the astral body or etheric body as external images, we can try to think of these concepts from a lived, that is, a real perspective, thereby exploring the conditions of our consciousness. However, this does not lead to an insight into the connotations of SS, through which these concepts became part of this discourse—at least not for me or others. I don’t think you’ve given me an insightful answer about whether the concepts of SS, for you as a non-clairvoyant or uninitiated person (I’m assuming, apologies if I’m wrong), are realities in the same way as your everyday life-world.

Güney27 wrote: ↑Fri Jun 20, 2025 9:11 pm PS 2: I have read a bit into Scheler's ideas and found very interesting approaches that remind me of Steiner, but in the tone of Heidegger, if I may put it that way. I will continue reading and am excited to see how his phenomenological methodology is structured.

Güney27 wrote: ↑Fri Jun 20, 2025 7:42 pm In *GA 5*, Steiner discusses fascinating philosophical themes. He critiques the Platonic separation of idea and appearance. Later, he views Plato in a different context, as someone who consciously moved within ideational spheres. Yet, I find something Platonic in Steiner’s philosophy: does he not also see ideas as a sphere distant (in a phenomenological sense) from appearances, which are then actualized in concepts through the movement of thinking and added to appearances to attain knowledge (which, in Steiner’s works, simultaneously signifies the manifestation or genesis of the “world”)? This semantic sphere seems to me the pivotal point of Steiner’s philosophy. We cannot grasp this sphere through intellectual models, as they are always already crystallizations of this Platonic dimension; any theory of the semantic dimension would inevitably fail. Nor can we say anything about this dimension, such as recognizing its genesis or describing its “essence.” How, then, does thinking inhabit this dimension, and how can we speak about it? This is, for me, the most important topic. I see interesting approaches in Steiner’s philosophy and in Heidegger’s hermeneutics, but neither offers a fully satisfactory methodology.

AshvinP wrote: ↑Mon Jun 23, 2025 1:48 pm

Güney27 wrote: ↑Fri Jun 20, 2025 7:42 pm In *GA 5*, Steiner discusses fascinating philosophical themes. He critiques the Platonic separation of idea and appearance. Later, he views Plato in a different context, as someone who consciously moved within ideational spheres. Yet, I find something Platonic in Steiner’s philosophy: does he not also see ideas as a sphere distant (in a phenomenological sense) from appearances, which are then actualized in concepts through the movement of thinking and added to appearances to attain knowledge (which, in Steiner’s works, simultaneously signifies the manifestation or genesis of the “world”)? This semantic sphere seems to me the pivotal point of Steiner’s philosophy. We cannot grasp this sphere through intellectual models, as they are always already crystallizations of this Platonic dimension; any theory of the semantic dimension would inevitably fail. Nor can we say anything about this dimension, such as recognizing its genesis or describing its “essence.” How, then, does thinking inhabit this dimension, and how can we speak about it? This is, for me, the most important topic. I see interesting approaches in Steiner’s philosophy and in Heidegger’s hermeneutics, but neither offers a fully satisfactory methodology.

Guney, I'd like to add a comment on the above. I hope it's evident that we understand the place from which this kind of objection is coming. As you point out, in the early works, Steiner himself critiques the philosophers and theologians of his time who speak of ideal realms, beings, purposes, telos, and so on (through the lens of Nietzsche and other philosophers), in a floating metaphysical way, disconnected from our concrete phenomenal experiential states. This is the opposite extreme of the metaphysical materialism that postulates invisible atoms, energies, and forces which 'govern' the World flow. In both cases, the speculative mental pictures act to obscure sensitivity to our real-time inner flow of spiritual gestures through which the World flow reveals its content to us. We have discussed this danger in many essays on the forum as well.

Now it seems that some people also believe that Steiner, in his later works, fell into the same trap that he cautioned others about in his early works. This is one of FB's main critiques, for example. He feels that Steiner didn't quite realize how he allowed the disembodied 'Platonism' to creep into his supersensible investigations, and thus he began to perceive hierarchical beings, purposes, intentional trajectories of evolution, and so on. It's not that his investigations lack all validity and truth, but that his experience of inner dynamics became conditioned by this Platonic tendency, and thus he constructed a whole spiritual evolutionary narrative that could have just as easily been spoken about in other ways (not involving hierarchical beings, evolutionary epochs, and such), and indeed has been characterized in other ways by other 20th century thinkers.

In the above view, we can only go so far in our phenomenal investigation of the inner dynamics (the semantic dimension) at our current stage of evolution before we reach an ineffable limit. Anyone who speaks concretely about going beyond this ineffable limit must be subtly resorting to metaphysical speculations, which may or may not be true, but cannot be verified phenomenologically. Is this similar to what you are stating above? If so, then I hope it's established that it is not something we have left unexamined in our contemplations of spiritual science and its research/revelations (just as Steiner didn't leave it unexamined in his early works). If not, then maybe you can help me better understand.