Re: Saving the materialists
Posted: Wed Nov 13, 2024 7:33 pm
Cleric wrote: ↑Wed Nov 13, 2024 5:52 pm The tricky thing (as seen in the conversation posted above by Ashvin) is that if we speak of knowing this prime reality, he would affirm that it is possible and we do that with Stimmung. It is very difficult to point out what it means to know that reality in a higher sense. I guess one way to show that something more is implied, is by asking whether he conceives of a Cosmic scale, fully conscious inner existence that, for example, shapes the inner reality of the planetary systems, within which our micro life is embedded.
I will add here that people such as JW, and also the guy I quoted above, are highly critical of BK's analytic idealism because they feel it is dogmatic metaphysics, speculative reasoning about a transcendent realm of 'consciousness'. They feel such an approach was already thoroughly evaluated and ruled out by Kant. And that is generally correct - that is what BK (and many others) are doing and it was discerned as self-contradictory and defeating by Kant and neo-Kantians for a number of reasons.
They feel that their approach, in contrast, sticks with immanent experience (which, of course, is generally equated to bodily experience). They often align themselves with Goethean phenomenology for this reason (and I think FB does this as well), and imagine the metaphysicians and spiritualists are simply projecting familiar immanent experiences into the "beyond" to fashion an encompassing theory. On the other hand, the aesthetic sense (of music and poetry, for ex.) is undeniable experience and so is bodily experience, which for JW bottoms out at the experience of energetic flux (also reached by quantum science). He feels experience reveals that there is no consciousness without life, and there is no life without this energetic dynamic. Of course he fails to discern that the meaning of "energetic dynamic" can only be discerned through his real-time thinking activity.
For that reason, I think any talk of Cosmic-scale conscious activity will be immediately discarded as irrelevant metaphysics, transcendental speculation already conclusively ruled out by Kant. As we know, this prejudice comes from the unwillingness to refocus attention from the content of the concepts used, which indeed are often pointing to remote metaphysical realities, to the inner gestures symbolized by the concepts, to gradually heighten sensitivity to the latter through the portal of the concepts. Until that happens, the concepts symbolizing invisible inner gestures can only be understood by them as an attempt at dogmatic metaphysics like BK except in more spiritualistic or esoteric language/form.
I think it's important that these concerns with dogmatic metaphysics are reflected back to them, so it is shown that the essential Kantian critique is grasped and acknowledged as valid to some extent. I will share my response to the other guy, which borrows from the Phonograph essays, in case that can be helpful in some way. Although JW may be even more difficult to get a straightforward answer from because he seems to have rejected the cognitive nature of the 'prime reality' as well.
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Ok, great, I am happy that your position does not foreclose on investigating the conditions of cognitive experience (which are themselves cognitive in nature). Then the question becomes, what does such an investigation look like? As you put it:
"The question isn’t whether we can investigate the categorical conditions of experience—Kant’s own work demonstrates we can and must—but rather how we can do so without falling into transcendental illusion."
This is a critical question and it points to this tricky phrase, "transcendental illusion". How can we be sure whether the concepts we use to symbolize supersensible realities are (a) pointing to phenomenal aspects *within* the subject's own cognitive capacities and expression of those capacities or (b) trying to point to some metaphysical realm of attributes, ideas, beings, etc. (essentially like BK's MAL, but also the particle-waves or quantum fields of materialists, the realms and beings of spiritualists, etc.).
I think we agree that the vast majority of modern philosophical and religious systems, and scientific theories about the 'nature of reality', are like (b) and point to the "beyond" that we all agree is both unnecessary for true knowledge and fatally self-contradictory. Rather, to be firmly within (a), our concepts need to become like descriptions of first-person cognitive experience and its inner dynamics. Our philosophical method should become a *science* of the conditions of cognitive experience. I agree that Kant started out on this path and attained some basic results. How can we go further?
I think we need to first fully appreciate exactly what you say - the investigation of cognitive capacities necessarily manifests as an expression of those capacities. In other words, the mental pictures (thoughts) we use to investigate the conditions of cognitive experience are themselves continually constrained and structured by the conditions it is investigating. The whole process can start to feel like a recursive paradox, in that sense, like a dog chasing its own tail. As we try to chase the structure of our thinking activity with our mental pictures, the former continues to morph and we can never catch up with the *real-time* cognitive process. That is because our mental pictures about the process are continually receding from the real-time process, like dead skin shed from a snake. Our thinking becomes like a hand that tries to draw a picture of ‘itself drawing a picture of ‘itself drawing a picture of itself ‘…’ ’ ’, and so on in an infinite recursion. (see image below)
So is it possible to have actual knowledge of the real-time process through which our cognitive states of being metamorphose? I say such knowledge is indeed possible, although, unsurprisingly, it requires us to conduct our cognitive activity in novel ways. It is obvious that simply producing more and more intellectual models about the "conditions of experience", no matter how refined, will always maintain the duality between the theoretical process that we experience in our thoughts and the actual process through which these same theoretical thoughts flow. Initially, we can seek the reality of the actual cognitive process only as a quite indistinct feeling. Hopefully, over time, this feeling will become something much more refined, attaining a meaningful texture imbued with clear intuition, just like our mental pictures are imbued with intuition. That refinement is attained through imaginative concentration (and this is where spiritual science starts).
I can elaborate more on that but I am interested to hear your thoughts. Does this seem like a real possibility and a fruitful avenue of investigating the conditions of cognitive experience, which does not reject Kant's foundation but builds on it?